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PENNSYLVANIA
PROVISION -

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

ACT

-

EXCLUSIVITY

PERMISSIBILITY OF COMMON LAW ACTION AGAINST EM-

DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE - The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held that the exclusive remedy provision of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act does not bar an employee of a
medical services provider from bringing a common law tort action
against his employer when the employee is injured while obtaining
treatment in the employer's facility.
Tatrai v. PresbyterianUniversity Hospital, 497 Pa. 247, 439 A.2d
1162 (1982).
PLOYER -

On May 27, 1975, Ms. Tatrai, an employee of Presbyterian University Hospital1 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, became ill while
working and was directed by her supervisor to go to the hospital's
emergency room for medical treatment.2 In the emergency room,
she was placed on an x-ray table, the footrest of which collapsed
while the table was being rotated to an upright position.3 Ms. Tatrai fell from the x-ray table and was injured. She subsequently
filed a complaint against the hospital based on two counts, trespass
and assumpsit, alleging negligence and breach of a warranty of the
safety of the hospital's services and equipment.4
The hospital filed an answer alleging that at the time of the incident, Ms. Tatrai was an employee whose exclusive remedy was
under section 303(a) of The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act. 5 The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County en1. Appellant was employed as an operating room technician. Tatrai v. Presbyterian
Univ. Hosp., 497 Pa. 247, 249, 439 A.2d 1162, 1163 (1982).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Tatrai v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 284 Pa. Super. 300, 302, 425 A.2d 823, 824
(1981), rev'd, 497 Pa. 247, 439 A.2d 1162 (1982). See The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, § 303(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983), which provides:
"The liability of an employer under this Act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all
other liability to such employees . . . on account of any injury .. . as defined in Section
301(c)(1) .... " Id.
Section 301(c)(1) of the Act provides in pertinent part: "The terms 'injury' and 'personal injury,' as used in this act, shall be construed to mean an injury to an employee...
arising in the course of his employment and related thereto.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §
411(1) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983) (emphasis added).
In her reply to the hospital's allegation, Ms. Tatrai averred that she was a patient at the
time of her injury and that she was not acting in the scope of her employment. 284 Pa.
Super. at 302, 425 A.2d at 824.
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tered a verdict for the hospital6 finding that the Act did indeed
provide an exclusive remedy which barred Ms. Tatrai's action.7
The court found that the medical treatment given to Ms. Tatrai
was provided to her as an employee in the normal course of her
employment,' and that her presence in the emergency department
was required.'
6. The hospital had filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied by the
court of common pleas because there was a possible factual problem as to whether Ms.
Tatrai was required to go to the emergency room and therefore be present on the employer's
premises. 284 Pa. Super. at 302, 425 A.2d at 824. The parties went to trial on the basis of an
alleged stipulation of the relevant facts, with a further stipulation that the judge should first
decide the issue of whether Ms. Tatrai's exclusive remedy was under the Act. Id. It was
agreed that if the court ruled in favor of Ms. Tatrai on this issue the parties would proceed
before a jury, and if the court found in favor of the hospital, a non-jury verdict would be
entered. Id. The court decided the question in favor of the hospital and entered a non-jury
verdict in its favor. Id.
7. 284 Pa. Super. at 302, 425 A.2d at 824.
8. The common pleas court found section 301(c) of the Act to be dispositive of the
issue at bar. 284 Pa. Super. at 302-03, 425 A.2d at 824. That section, in pertinent part, reads
as follows:
(1) The term 'injury arising in the course of his employment,' as used in this
article ....
shall include all other injuries sustained while the employe is actually
engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon
the employer's premises or elsewhere, and shall include all injuries caused by the
condition of the premises or by the operation of the employer's business or affairs
thereon, sustained by the employe, who, though not so engaged, is injured upon the
premises occupied by or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer's business or affairs are being carried on, the employe's presence thereon being required by the nature of his employment.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(1) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983) (emphasis added).
The common pleas court further found that "[tihe parties have stipulated that plaintiff
became ill during the course of her employment and that she was directed by her supervisor
as to how she should proceed in seeking the medical attention which was rendered by the
employer on its premises." See 284 Pa. Super. at 303, 425 A.2d at 824 (quoting Tatrai v.
Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., No. G.D. 77-01375 at 3 (Common Pleas Ct. Mar. 29, 1979).
9. 497 Pa. at 249, 439 A.2d at 1163. The common pleas court found:
It is clear to the court that the medical treatment being afforded to plaintiff was not
being afforded to her as a member of the general public seeking the medical services
of the hospital, but were being afforded to her instead as an employee by her employer in the normal course of her employment, and that her presence in the particular place on the employer's premises was indeed required. This situation is analogous
to that of an employee in a steel mill who might become ill during his work shift. It is
not at all uncommon that employers in such industries maintain at least rudimentary
health care facilities on the premises to which the employee would report in the normal course to seek first aid or other treatment by other employees of his employer.
Surely no one would argue that were such medical services rendered negligently, such
negligence would give rise to a common law action of tort against the employer. This
court is convinced that in such circumstances, the employee's remedy would be limited to that provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act. The situation here is, to
all practical intents and purposes, identical.
That being the case, and the policy of the law as enunciated in many appellate
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On appeal taken by Ms. Tatrai,'0 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court affirmed the lower court's decision." Ms. Tatrai appealed
again, to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which reversed, holding
that the appellant, Ms. Tatrai, was not barred by the Act from
bringing suit against the hospital."
Justice Nix, writing a separate opinion announcing the judgment
of the court,' 3 explained that section 303 provides that in return
for the benefit of strict liability provided by the Act, an employee
surrenders the right to any form of compensation for a work-related injury other than that provided under the Act.' 4 He noted
decisions being to interpret the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act liberally in order to provide the broadest possible coverage for employees, this court has
no hesitancy in concluding that the injury suffered by plaintiff in the case at bar is
compensable under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act. See: Epler v.
North American Rockwell Corporation,[482 Pa. 391] 393 A.2d 1163 (Pa. Supreme
Ct. 1978); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. United States Steel Corporation, 31 Pa. Cmwlth. 329, 376 A.2d 271 (1977). Mackey v. Adamski, No. 3040 October
Term, 1979, Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
284 Pa. Super. at 303-04, 425 A.2d at 824-25 (quoting Tatrai v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp.,
No. G.D. 77-01375 at 3-4 (Common Pleas Ct. Mar. 29, 1979).
10. The common pleas court's opinion in support of the verdict for the hospital was
adopted by the court en banc. Ms. Tatrai filed exceptions, and from the order dismissing
those exceptions, appealed. 284 Pa. Super. at 302, 425 A.2d at 824.
11. 284 Pa. Super. 300, 425 A.2d 823 (1981), rev'd, 497 Pa. 247, 439 A.2d 1162 (1982).
In addition to the cases relied upon by the court of common pleas, see supra note 9, the
superior court also relied upon Shaffer v. Somerset Community Hosp., 205 Pa. Super. 419,
211 A.2d 49 (1965) and Babich v. Pavich, 270 Pa. Super. 140, 411 A.2d 218 (1979). The
superior court noted that Shaffer involved a nurse who slipped on ice in the hospital's parking lot, and the court found that "[s]he was on the premises of her employer when she was
injured ....
The fact that her actual duties were in the hospital building itself does not
affect her right to compensation." Id. at 422, 211 A.2d at 50. See 284 Pa. Super. at 305, 425
A.2d at 825. The superior court found that Ms. Tatrai's injuries, like the injuries to the
plaintiff in Shaffer, "were a direct result of the conditions in which she encountered upon
the premises." Id. at 305-06, 425 A.2d at 826.
The superior court found that Babich v. Pavich, 270 Pa. Super. 140, 411 A.2d 218
(1979), also supported the lower court's result, noting that Babich involved an employee
who was required to use the employer's dispensary, and whom the court held was prohibited
from suing for the negligence of the company's doctor. 284 Pa. Super. at 305, 425 A.2d at
825-26.
The superior court concluded that more so than the employees in Babich or Shaffer or
in any of the cases cited by the common pleas court, Ms. Tatrai was acting under the direction of her supervisor. Id. at 306, 425 A.2d at 426.
12. 497 Pa. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166. Justice Nix wrote an opinion announcing the
reversal of the superior court. Id. at 248, 439 A.2d at 1163. Justice Roberts filed a separate
opinion concurring in the judgment. Joining in Justice Roberts' decision were Chief Justice
O'Brien and Justices Larsen and Flaherty. Justices Kauffman and Wilkinson did not participate in the decision. Id. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166.
13. See 497 Pa. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166.
14. Id. at 250, 439 A.2d at 1163 (Nix, J.). See, § 301(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983) which provides in pertinent
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that there was no question that the appellant was an employee at
the time of the injury, and that therefore, the question was
whether or not her injury occurred during the course of her employment. 5 Justice Nix observed that if there was not a finding
that the injury occurred during the course of the appellant's employment, then the hospital could not claim workmen's compensation immunity as a defense against the negligence action instituted
by her."6
Justice Nix interpreted section 301(c) of the Act, defining the
statutory term "injury arising in the course of employment,"' 7 as
giving rise to two distinct categories of injuries.' 8 The first category, he observed, includes those injuries which occur while the
employee is actually engaged in the furtherance of the employer's
business, regardless of the place of injury.1 9 The second category
includes those injuries which are sustained on the premises of the
part:
Every employer shall be liable for compensation for personal injury to, or for the
death of each employe, [sic] by an injury in the course of his employment, and such
compensation shall be paid in all cases by the employer, without regard to negligence,
according to the schedule contained in sections three hundred and six and three hundred and seven of this article.
Id. Sections 306 and 307 of the Act provide schedules for payment for compensable injuries.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 511-517, 531, 542, 561, 562 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
15. 497 Pa. at 250, 439 A.2d at 1163 (Nix, J.).
16. Id.
17. For the pertinent portion of § 301(c), as cited by Justice Nix, see supra note 8.
18. 497 Pa. at 251, 439 A.2d at 1163-64 (Nix, J.). See Naugle v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 62 Pa. Commw. 132, 133 n.2, 435 A.2d 295, 296 n.2 (1981) ("[slection
301(c)(1) . . .details two categories of compensable injuries arising in the course of employment"); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.v. United States Steel Corp., 31 Pa. Commw.
329, 333, 376 A.2d 271, 273 (1977) ("[ilnjuries may be sustained in the course of employment in two distinct situations"); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. L.L. Stearns &
Sons, 20 Pa. Commw. 244, 249-50, 341 A.2d 543, 545-46 (1975) (an employee is covered by
the Act when in furtherance of the employer's business, regardless of whether off or on the
premises, and in most cases, when on the employer's premises).
19. 497 Pa. at 251, 439 A.2d at 1164 (Nix, J.). See Dolan v. Linton's Lunch, 397 Pa.
114, 152 A.2d 887 (1959) (common law tort action against employer not allowed where employee was assaulted by a fellow employee on the employer's premises, unless it could be
shown that the attack against him was for purely personal reasons); McIntyre v. Strausser,
365 Pa. 507, 76 A.2d 220 (1950) (common law tort action against employer permitted where
employee was injured in an automobile collision while a passenger in his employer's vehicle,
and the contract of employment provided that the employer would furnish means of employee's going to and from work); Butrin v. Manion Steel Barrel Co., 361 Pa. 166, 63 A.2d
345 (1949) (common law tort action against employer not allowed where employees were
injured in an automobile accident while they were being driven to work by a fellow employee who had been directed by employer to transport them to the employer's premises to
work on a special assignment).
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employer.2 0
Referring to the first category of injuries, Justice Nix noted that
the appellant had been directed to go to the emergency room by
her supervisor at the onset of her illness. 2 He found that while

such a direction by the employer may shed some light on whether
the injury occurred while in the furtherance of the employer's affairs, it is not conclusive on that point.2 Justice Nix maintained
that the mere direction to engage in the activity is not sufficient to
establish "course of employment" if the activity was not in furtherance of the employer's business."
Justice Nix addressed the hospital's assertion that immediate
care of one of its employees who becomes ill on the job provides
protection not only for the employee but also for the employer's
patients,"" and the hospital's further argument that appellant's pay
20. 497 Pa. at 251, 439 A.2d at 1164 (Nix, J.). See Epler v. North Am. Rockwell Corp.,
482 Pa. 391, 393 A.2d 1163 (1978) (compensation allowed where decedent employee was
struck by an automobile as he crossed a public street which linked employer's plant with its
parking lot); Del Rossi v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 210 Pa. Super. 485, 233 A.2d 597
(1967) (compensation denied, and common law tort action against employer allowed, where
decedent employee was injured in an automobile accident while crossing a medial barrier on
the turnpike leading away from maintenance depot where he had been stationed); Eberle v.
Union Dental Co., 182 Pa. Super. 519, 128 A.2d 136 (1956), affd, 390 Pa. 112, 134 A.2d 559
(1957) (compensation denied where employee slipped and fell on a brick driveway on the
employer's premises, open to use of the general public, and which employee did not have to
traverse in order to reach or leave his work); Kasavage v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 109
Pa. Super. 231, 167 A. 473 (1933) (compensation granted where employee slipped and fell on
a road located on employer's premises, near the entrance to the mine where employee
worked, while employee was on his way to work); Morucci v. Susquehanna Collieries Co.,
297 Pa. 508, 147 A. 533 (1929) (compensation denied where employee "hitched" a ride home
from work in the evening on employer's loaded coal cars, although employer provided transportation to work on the empty coal cars every morning).
21. 497 Pa. at 251, 439 A.2d at 1164 (Nix, J.).
22. Id.
23. Id. Justice Nix cited several cases in which there was found to be a furtherance of
the employer's business. See Butrin v. Manion Steel Barrel Co., 361 Pa. 166, 63 A.2d 345
(1949), see supra note 19; Hoffman v. Montgomery, 146 Pa. Super. 399, 22 A.2d 762 (1941)
(compensation allowed where employee, traveling in his own automobile with another employee in search of lanterns for a job site, was fatally injured in an accident which occurred
during a slight deviation from the normal route); Bock v. Reading, 120 Pa. Super. 468, 182
A. 732 (1936) (compensation allowed where employee fatally injured in an automobile accident on his way to work in a vehicle supplied to him for that purpose by his employer);
Martin v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 108 Pa. Super. 570, 165 A. 514 (1933) (compensation
allowed where employee fatally injured in an automobile accident while on his way to work
under special instructions from his employer as to where to report to work, and where his
employer had begun paying him wages from the moment he left home to begin his trip to
work).
24. 497 Pa. at 252, 439 A.2d at 1164 (Nix, J.). The hospital stressed its need to have
alert and physically healthy employees in the area of health care services. Id.
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had continued during the time she was receiving the emergency
treatment. 5 He found it to be a tenuous proposition that the indirect benefit to the hospital of a healthy employee satisfied the statutory requirement of being actually engaged in the furtherance of
the employer's business. 26 He observed that it would ignore reality
to deny that the appellant's purpose in seeking treatment was primarily for her own benefit.27 Justice Nix found that the maintenance of good health, while of incidental value to the employer, is
primarily a benefit to the employee whose well-being is served. 8
Justice Nix further considered the hospital's argument that because the appellant's pay continued while she received treatment,
she was continuing in the performance of her employer's business.29 Justice Nix was not persuaded by this reasoning, observing
that although there was a specific unit provided for employee
health services, appellant was injured in the emergency room
which was open for the general public.3 0 He noted that the hospital
billed Blue Cross for the treatment rendered as it would have for a
member of the general public.3 1 Justice Nix therefore found that
the appellant's injury did not fit within the first category of inju32
ries sustained during the course of employment.
Justice Nix then sought to determine if the appellant's injury
fell within the second category of injuries generally found to be
compensable under the Act, i.e., those injuries sustained on the
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Justice Nix distinguished Griffin v. Acme Coal Co., 161 Pa. Super. 28, 54 A.2d
69 (1947). In Griffin, an employee reported to his employer's mine in order to pick up his
pay check. He was injured while waiting in the office where it was customary for employees
to obtain their pay. Id. at 29, 54 A.2d at 69-70. The court in Griffin found that the injury
was sustained during the course of employment, because payment is an integral part of the
employment scheme, and the employee was obtaining his pay in the manner Sustomary to
the business. Id. at 30, 54 A.2d at 70.
Justice Nix determined that in Tatrai, however, the court was dealing with an event
"totally extraneous to the employment scheme." 497 Pa. at 252, 439 A.2d at 1165 (Nix, J.).
He indicated that the onset of illness interrupted the appellant's activities pursuant to her
employment, and rendered her incapable of continuing those responsibilities. Id. Justice Nix
noted that the fact that appellant's prompt 'recovery would hasten her return to her normal
activities "does not alter the fact that the immediate purpose of seeking the treatment was
personal." Id. at 253, 439 A.2d at 1165 (Nix, J.).
29. 497 Pa. at 253, 439 A.2d at 1165 (Nix, J.).
30. Id. Justice Nix stated that "[n]othing in this record suggests that.if the employee
had sought to utilize private resources she would not have received her pay for the day." Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.

1983

Recent Decisions

569

premises of the employer.3 3 He utilized a threefold analysis of the
requirements for compensability under this category of injury,
stating that it must be shown that the injury was caused by the
condition of the premises or by the operation of the employer's
business; that the injury in fact occurred upon the employer's
premises; and that the employee's presence on the premises was
34
required by the nature of the employment.
According to Justice Nix, the Pennsylvania legislature clearly intended that the Act cover an employee who is injured on the employer's premises but not actively engaged in his employment duties at the time. 5 He noted, however, that the Act also requires
that the employee's presence on the employer's premises at the
time of injury be due to the nature of the employer's business.3 6
Justice Nix emphasized those cases in which the employee was
covered by the Act, as including those where although the employee was not directly engaged in his assigned task, he was nevertheless required to be on or about the employer's premises during
the interval when the injuries were sustained.3 7 Justice Nix noted
that, in those instances in which the injuries were found to be compensable under the Act, the employee's presence was either required by the terms of the employment or facilitated the disposition of the employer's affairs.a He observed that here the concern
was the health of the appellant and her presence on the premises
33. Id.
34. Id. See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. L.L. Stearns & Sons, 20 Pa.
Commw. 244, 341 A.2d 543 (1975).
35. 497 Pa. at 253, 439 A.2d at 1165 (Nix, J.).
36. Id. at 253-54, 439 A.2d at 1165 (Nix, J.).
37. Id. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 50 Pa.
Commw. 45, 412 A.2d 196 (1980) (compensation granted when employee, returning from a
vending machine area on employer's premises, was splashed in the face with a co-worker's
soft drink, causing him to fall); Henry v. Lit Bros., 193 Pa. Super. 543, 165 A.2d 406 (1960)
(compensation granted employee injured during his lunch hour while engaged in a game of
football after eating in the employee's cafeteria; the employer encouraged employees to use
the cafeteria and permitted the use of the yard for athletic activities); Haas v. Brotherhood
of Transp. Workers, 158 Pa. Super. 291, 44 A.2d 776 (1945) (compensation granted where
decedent employee answered the door and was injured in an attack by a third party who
was inquiring whether any union officials of the company were present in the building at the
time); Morrow v. James S. Murray & Sons, 136 Pa. Super. 277, 7 A.2d 109 (1939) (compensation granted where employee truck driver had engaged in setting off firecrackers with a
fellow employee prior to starting work; at the time the injury occurred from an exploding
firecracker, employee was in his employer's truck and had reported to work); Oldinsky v.
Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co., 92 Pa. Super. 328 (1927) (compensation
granted where decedent employee jumped in a chute on the employer's premises to take a
ride during his lunch hour and was suffocated).
38. 497 Pa. at 254, 439 A.2d at 1166 (Nix, J.).
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at the time of injury was only fortuitous. 9
Summarizing the case, Justice Nix found that at the time of appellant's illness, there was no physician on duty at the employee
health service; she therefore went to the hospital emergency room
for treatment.4 0 Justice Nix indicated that the sole reason appellant went to the emergency room was for treatment of her illness,
and she was treated there like any other member of the general
public. 1 Justice Nix concluded that because appellant's presence
in the emergency room was not in furtherance of her employer's
business and was not required by reason of her employment, the
Act was not her exclusive remedy. 42 Thus, appellant's complaint
was reinstated. 3
Justice Roberts, in a concurring opinion joined by a majority of
the court, 44 agreed that the superior court's decision should be reversed, but argued that it was irrelevant to appellant's right to proceed in trespass and assumpsit whether her injury arose during the
course of her employment. 45 He explained that the only relevant
factor was that the injury occurred while the appellant was receiving treatment in a facility open to the general public." Justice
Roberts reasoned that in holding itself out to the public as a provider of medical services, the hospital owed a duty to all of its patients, and there was no basis for distinguishing appellant, a paying customer, from any other member of the public injured during
the course of treatment.47
Justice Roberts found that in an analogous setting, the Supreme
Court of California had observed that where an injury arises from
a relationship distinct from that of employer-employee, the employer should not be shielded from liability at common law by re39. Id.
40. Id. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166 (Nix, J.).
41. Id.
42. Id. Justice Nix further reasoned that it was not necessary to distinguish appellant
from any other member of the public injured during the course of treatment because the
risk of injury which appellant suffered was a risk to-which any other person receiving like
treatment would have been subjected. Id. Justice Nix maintained that occurrence of the
injury was not made more likely by the fact of her employment. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (Roberts, J.). Justice Roberts' opinion was joined by Chief Justice O'Brien and
Justices Larsen and Flaherty. Justices Kauffman and Wilkinson did not participate. See
supra note 12.
45. 497 Pa. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166 (Roberts, J.).

46. Id.
47.

Id.
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course to the exclusivity of workers' compensation.4 1 Justice Rob-

erts noted that the Supreme Court of Ohio had reached a similar
result, holding that where a hospital provides treatment to an employee, it should be charged with the obligations arising from a
hospital-patient relationship. 9
Justice Roberts also pointed out that the United States Supreme
Court had similarly recognized the independent force of a duty
owed to the general public in Reed v. The Yaka,50 a case involving
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.5" He
48. Id. See D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 3d 661, 666, 613 P.2d 238, 24142, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177, 181 (1980). In D'Angona, the employee was a physical therapist at a
hospital. She contracted a disease in the course of her employment during February, 1971.
She was admitted to the hospital on February 19, 1971, where she developed a high fever,
infection, and gangrene, resulting in the amputation of her toes and fingers. The physicians
in the hospital, which was run by the county, were allegedly negligent in their diagnosis and
treatment of her. The court allowed a common law tort action against the county because of
the distinct hospital/patient relationship which existed. Id. at 666, 613 P.2d at 241-42, 166
Cal. Rptr. at 181.
49. 497 Pa. at 256, 439 A.2d at 1166-67 (Roberts, J.). See Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas
Co., 55 Ohio St.2d 183, 378 N.E.2d 488 (1978). In Guy, the employee alleged that mercury
poisoning contracted in the course of her employment was exacerbated by the failure of the
hospital-employer to properly diagnose her condition. The common law tort action brought
against the hospital was allowed. Id. at 190, 378 N.E.2d at 492. The court in Guy stated:
Appellee's argument is that Ohio's workers' compensation requires us to ignore the
fact that appellee hospital was not only the employer of appellant, but also the treating hospital and, as such, charged with the obligations that arise in a hospital-patient
relationship ....
Appellant's need for protection from malpractice was neither more
nor less than that of another's employee ....
The appellee hospital, with respect to
its treatment of the appellant, did so as a hospital, not as an employer, and its relationship with the appellant was that of a hospital-patient with all the concomitant
traditional obligations. Furthermore, it is not denied that, if appellant's compensable
injury had been aggravated by any other hospital, appellant would have had a cause
of action for malpractice. We find no compelling reason why an action should be less
viable merely because the traditional obligations and duties of the tortfeasor spring
from the extra-relational capacity of the employer, rather than a third party.
Id.
50. 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
51. 497 Pa. at 256, 439 A.2d at 1167 (Roberts, J.). See 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
In Reed, the plaintiff was injured when a wooden pallet, located on the ship, "The
Yaka", on which he was standing, broke due to a latent defect. The pallet was furnished by
Pan Atlantic, the plaintiff's employer, who was joined as an additional defendant by the
owner of "The Yaks." The court found that Pan Atlantic could be held liable for the unseaworthiness of the vessel because of the duty of seaworthiness owed to the general public.
The plaintiff's common law tort action was therefore held not barred by the Longshoremen's Act. 373 U.S. at 415-16. The Court in Reed found that:
[Ojnly blind adherence to the superficial meaning of a statute could prompt us to
ignore the fact that Pan-Atlantic was not only an employer of longshoremen but was
also a bareboat charterer and operator of a ship and, as such, was charged with the
traditional, absolute, and non-delegable obligation of seaworthiness which it could
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observed that, as was indicated in Reed, only "blind adherence" to
the language of the Act, which was designed to help and not hinder
employees in their pursuit of benefits, could deprive the appellant
of the opportunity to proceed with her causes of action.5 2 Justice
Roberts concluded that without regard to issues relating to the
Act, the appellant must be permitted to proceed directly to trial. 3
As Justice Nix indicated, an employee surrenders certain rights
which were available to him at common law in return for the benefits provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act.5 4 Under the
workers' compensation acts of the various states, in general, the
employer is subjected to a form of strict liability which requires
that, as long as an injury is sustained within the course and scope
of employment, the employer must provide the employee with the
benefits outlined in the particular act without regard to the employer's negligence or lack thereof 5 5 The employer is protected,
however, from any form of liability towards the injured employee
other than compensation payments. e
Under the Pennsylvania Act, the term "course of employment"
has been construed very broadly, with many types of injuries held
to be compensable under the Act. Many courts have barred common law actions, preferring to find statutory compensability under
the "course of employment" concept.5 7 This broad application of
not be permitted to avoid.
Id. at 415. See 497 Pa. at 257, 439 A.2d at 1167 (Roberts, J.).
52. 497 Pa. at 257, 439 A.2d at 1167 (Roberts, J.).
53. Id.
54. See 497 Pa. at 250, 439 A.2d at 1163 (Nix, J.). See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
55. This requirement is found in the Pennsylvania Act at § 301(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
77, § 431 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). See supra note 14.
56. See § 303(a) of the Pennsylvania Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (Purdon Supp.
1982-1983). See supra note 5.
57. See, e.g., Hamler v. Waldron, 445 Pa. 262, 284 A.2d 725 (1971) (compensation allowed and tort action barred where employee loaned to a general contractor by his employer
was injured when an inadequately shored foundation wall collapsed on him; employee still
found to be in the employ of his original employer, not the borrowing employer); Brinker v.
Greensburg, 409 Pa. 110, 185 A.2d 593 (1960) (common law tort action against employer
barred where employee injured in an automobile collision with a fire truck; employee was a
volunteer fireman in his own automobile and held to be in the course of his employment);
Greenga v. Gordon, 389 Pa. 499, 133 A.2d 595 (1957) (common law tort action against individual partner barred where injuries were sustained as a result of alleged negligence of such
partner by an employee of the partnership in the course of his employment); Hyzy v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 384 Pa. 316, 121 A.2d 285 (1956) (compensation granted, and wrongful
death action barred, where employee fatally injured by a roof fall in the mine in which he
was employed, allegedly the result of his employer's neglect of a statutory duty); McIntyre
v. Strausser, 365 Pa. 507, 76 A.2d 220 (1960), see supra note 19.
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the Act has been especially prevalent in regard to injuries sustained on the employer's premises.58 Generally, if an injury occurs
on the employer's premises, it is determined compensable unless
the employee has abandoned the course of his employment or has
engaged in something entirely foreign to it.6
In contrast to Pennsylvania's interpretation of "course of employment," some states have adopted an exception to this type of
interpretation of compensability known as the "dual capacity"
doctrine. 60 Under the dual capacity doctrine, an employer, who
would normally be protected from common law liability by the exclusivity of a workers' compensation statute, may be sued for liability in tort by the injured employee if the employer occupies a
capacity or relationship separate from that of employer. 6" This
separate capacity must subject the employer to obligations independent of those imposed upon him in his capacity as employer.6 2
Thus, an employee can sue the employer for injuries sustained
while the employer was acting in a non-employment capacity.6 S
The basis for the distinction is that an employee, in accepting em-

ployment, is found to have assumed the hazards and risks emanating from that employment, but 64not those arising from the employer's extra-relational capacity.
The test for determining whether or not the dual capacity doctrine applies in a given factual situation is essentially two-fold.
58. See, e.g., Feaster v. S.K. Kelso & Sons, 22 Pa. Commw. 20, 347 A.2d 521 (1975)
(compensation granted where employee drowned while attending a picnic sponsored by employer for its employees and their families; employee held to be engaged in the furtherance
of the business or affairs of his employer); Henry v. Lit Bros., 193 Pa. Super. 543, 165 A.2d
406 (1960), see supra note 25; Weiss v. Friedman's Hotel, 176 Pa. Super. 98, 106 A.2d 867
(1954) (compensation granted where employee, who was required to live on employer's
premises, slipped and fell while taking a shower after temporarily leaving the kitchen in
which she was employed with employer's express approval; excessive heat required taking
several showers daily); Wolsko v. American Bridge Co., 158 Pa. Super. 339, 44 A.2d 873
(1945) (compensation granted where decedent employee fell to his death in the employer's
shipyard at a point approximately 1000 feet from his work station, about 15 minutes before
he was scheduled to begin work). See also supra note 37.
59. See A. BAEBImu, PENNSYLVANIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 410 (1975).
60. See generally, 2A A. LARSON, LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 72.80 (1976).
See also infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
61. LARSON, supra note 60, § 72.80, at 14-229.
62. Id. at § 72.83, at 14-245.
63. See Note, Dual Capacity Doctrine: Third-Party Liability of Employer-Manufacturer in Products Liability Litigation, 12 IND. L. Rav. 553 (1979).
64. See Comment, Workmen's Compensation and Employer Suability: The Dual Capacity Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 818 (1974). An employee "cannot be assumed to have
waived his right to bring a common law tort action against negligent third parties who coincidentally share the role of employer." Id. at 832.
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First, it requires not merely a separate legal theory which can be
applied to the employer, but rather that the employer's status be
capable of being split into two separate and distinct legal entities.a5
Secondly, this separate capacity of the employer must generate obligations or duties completely unrelated to those required by the
employer's primary capacity as employer. 66
California courts have been forerunners in adopting the dual capacity doctrine and in refining its application. In Duprey v.
Shane,17 the California Supreme Court held a physician-employer
liable for aggravating the injury of an employee, because the court
found two clear-cut relationships between the parties, that of employer-employee, and that of medical services provider-patient.as
Duprey was followed by Douglas v. E.&J. Gallo Winery. 9 In
Douglas, the employer was also the manufacturer of some of the
equipment used by its employees.70 The California Court of Appeals held that it would apply the dual capacity doctrine where an
employee was injured by equipment manufactured by the employer as long as the product was manufactured for sale to the
public, and not solely for the use of the employer. 71 The facts in
Douglas fell within the scope of this rule, and as a result, the common law tort action was allowed. 2
In its most recent case involving dual capacity, the California
Supreme Court in D'Angona v. County of Los Angeless found
that the defendant-employer owed a duty distinct from that owed
in its capacity as an employer: providing medical care free of negligence. 4 The case was similar factually to Tatrai in that both cases
65. See A. LARSON, supra note 60, § 72.83, at 14-245. It is therefore necessary to be
able to actually delineate the duties and responsibilities which pertain to each facet of the
employer's personality. Id.
66. Id. See also D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 3d 661, 666, 613 P.2d 238,
242, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177, 181 (1980).
67. 39 Cal.2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
68. Id. at 793, 249 P.2d at 15-16. Duprey involved an employee who was injured while
giving physical therapy to a patient. She allegedly received treatments by a fellow employee
and her employer which allegedly aggravated her condition. The common law tort action
against her employer was allowed. Id. at 793, 249 P.2d at 16.
69. 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977). Douglas involved an employee who
was injured in a fall when scaffolding on which he was working collapsed. The scaffolding
was manufactured by the employer for use by his own employees as well as for sale to the
general public.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 27 Cal.3d 661, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1980). See supra note 48.
74. Id. at 669, 613 P.2d at 244, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
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involved treatment of an employee of a medical services provider
in its own facility; however, the employee in D'Angona had been
admitted to the hospital as an inpatient when her allegedly negligent treatment was received.7 5
The Supreme Court of Ohio reached a similar conclusion to that
of the California courts in Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co. 7 6 In Guy,
the court held that the hospital, despite the fact it was appellant's
employer, 7 was nonetheless charged with the obligations that arise
in a hospital-patient relationship.7 8 The appellant's common law
tort action was therefore permitted. 9
The dual capacity doctrine has never been openly accepted by
the Pennsylvania courts, although Tropiano v. Travelers Insurance Co.8 0 has been interpreted to have impliedly adopted the doctrine.8 1 Tropiano involved an employee, injured on the job, who
was subsequently provided medical services and treatment, which
he claimed were harmful, by the workers' compensation insurance
carrier. The medical treatment was held by the court to have been
a separate and distinct function of the insurance carrier, not a part
of the employer's business. The employee's common law tort action
was therefore allowed.8 2 Despite the fact that it has been cited as
impliedly adopting dual capacity, the Tropiano case concerned
treatment of the employee's injury by the workers' compensation
insurance carrier, and not by the employer. Thus, the case is distinguishable from Tatrai, in which the treatment was rendered by
the employer itself.8 3
In contrast to Tropiano which permitted the employee's tort ac75. Id.
76. 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 378 N.E.2d 488 (1978). See supra note 49.
77. 55 Ohio St. 2d at 183, 378 N.E.2d at 488.
78. Id. The Ohio court stated:
The appellee hospital, with respect to its treatment of the appellant, did so as a hospital, not as an employer, and its relationship with the appellant was that of a hospital-patient with all the concomitant obligations. . . . We find no compelling reason
why an action should be less viable merely because the traditional obligations and
duties of the tortfeasor spring from the extra-relational capacity of the employer,
rather than a third party.
Id. at 190, 378 N.E.2d at 492.
79. Id.
80. 455 Pa. 360, 319 A.2d 426 (1974).
81. See supra note 63, at 563. This reasoning is not followed by a majority of the
courts, which continue to refuse to permit a common law action against an insurance carrier
who negligently provides medical services on behalf of the employer. Id. at 564.
82. 455 Pa. at 363, 319 A.2d at 427.
83. See 497 Pa. at 249, 439 A.2d at 1163.
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tion, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Babich v. Pavich8' found
injuries arising from allegedly negligent medical treatment by an
employer to be compensable under the Act. In Babich, the treatment was rendered to the employee by a physician in the employer's free dispensary. 5 The court addressed the issue of
whether the employee and the physician were co-employees, making the latter immune from tort liability."8 The court held that the
two were co-employees, and thus the injured employee's common
law tort action was barred under the Act.8 7 As a result, under the
Babich rule, it seems likely that had the appellant in Tatrai received treatment in the hospital's dispensary rather than in the
emergency room, her injury would have been found compensable
under the Act, because the circumstances would have closely approximated those in Babich.
In analyzing the court's decision in Tatrai, cases dealing with
the interpretation of the term "course of employment" should also
be considered. 8 The Pennsylvania courts have held that the term
is to be liberally construed, which has had the effect of extending
workers' compensation coverage to a broad range of injuries.88 As
noted above,9 0 where the employee's presence is required on the
premises, the employee's activities have generally been held to be
within the course of employment, and thus any injury resulting
therefrom will be found compensable. A case illustrating this use of
the "course of employment" theory is Del Rossi v. Pennsylvania
Turnpike Commission.9 1 In that case, a turnpike employee was fatally injured while leaving work in an automobile accident while
crossing the medial barrier leading away from the maintenance de84.
85.
86.

270 Pa. Super. 140, 411 A.2d 218 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 143, 411 A.2d at 220. See § 205 of the Act, discussed therein which provides:
If disability or death is compensable under this Act, a person shall not be liable
to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such disability or death for any
act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person
disabled or killed, except for intentional wrong.
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 77, § 72 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
87. 270 Pa. Super. at 145, 411 A.2d at 221. See supra note 86.
88. See Epler v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 Pa. 391, 393 A.2d 1163 (1978), see
supra note 20; Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 31 Pa.
Commw. 329, 376 A.2d 271 (1977), see supra note 18; Shaffer v. Somerset Community
Hosp., 205 Pa. Super. 419, 211 A.2d 49 (1965) (compensation allowed where employee, who
parked her automobile in a lot for employees, fell and was injured while walking from the
lot to begin her day's work).
89. See, e.g., supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
91. 210 Pa. Super. 485, 233 A.2d 597 (1967).
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pot where he had been working.9 2 The court allowed a common law
tort action, finding that the employee's presence on the highway at
that particular spot was not required by his employer. He was
therefore outside the course of employment, and strictly a member
of the traveling public at the time of the loss.9 3 Nevertheless, the
case is distinguishable from Tatrai in two ways: first, the accident
in Del Rossi occurred after working hours, and second, the appellant in Tatraihad been specifically directed to go to the emergency
9 4
room by her supervisor.
The common law tort action was denied, however, in two cases
substantially similar to Tatrai: Baur v. Mesta Machine Co.9 5 and
Babich v. Pavich.9 6 Both cases involved treatment of an employee
in the employer's free dispensary, and both were found to involve
injuries compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The feature which distinguishes these cases from Tatrai is that
neither employer was a health care provider, and neither dispensary was open to the public.97
In light of these cases, it appears that the court in Tatrai could
have decided the case on a "course of employment" rationale.
Thus, the question raised by the Tatrai decision is whether or not
it was necessary for the court to come to grips with the dual capacity doctrine. That doctrine was not discussed in the majority opinion of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 8 in which the court focused on whether the appellant's injury was within the course of
her employment. 99 In addition, it is clear that the supreme court
could have reversed the superior court on the grounds expressed in
92. Id. at 485, 233 A.2d at 597.
93. Id. Cf. Gieble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 41 Pa. Commw. 333, 399 A.2d 152 (1979)
(compensation denied where employee slipped, fell, and was injured in a retail store operated by her employer, in which she was shopping during her lunch hour); Eberle v. Union
Dental Co., 390 Pa. 112, 134 A.2d 559 (1957), see supra note 20.
94. See 497 Pa. at 249, 439 A.2d at 1163.
95. 393 Pa. 380, 143 A.2d 12 (1958) (compensation allowed where employee died of a
heart attack as a result of the failure of the employer's dispensary attendant to provide
proper medical care).
96. 270 Pa. Super. 140, 411 A.2d 218 (1979). See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying
text.
97. The lower courts in Tatrai did not, however, find these differences sufficient to
take the appellant's injury outside the scope of the Act. See Tatrai v. Presbyterian Univ.
Hosp., 284 Pa. Super. 300, 425 A.2d 823 (1981), rev'd, 497 Pa. 247, 439 A.2d 1162 (1982).
98. Id. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
99. 284 Pa. Super. at 302-03, 425 A.2d at 824-25. Indeed, the superior court pointed
out that there was a discrepancy over whether or not the appellant's presence on the premises was in fact required by her employer, and in addition, whether or not the medical treatment at issue was given to the appellant as a member of the general public. Id.
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Justice Nix's opinion. Thus, Justice Roberts' discussion of the dual
capacity doctrine was arguably unnecessary. It should be noted
that allowing an employee a common law tort action under the
dual capacity doctrine may not necessarily always be to the employee's advantage. The fact that the certainty of obtaining workers' compensation benefits would be forfeited by the employee in
exchange for the uncertainty of prevailing in a liability action must
be considered.
In any event, if the courts in Pennsylvania are to adopt the dual
capacity doctrine, a more appropriate vehicle than Tatrai might
have been chosen. Given the peculiar facts of the case: that the
injury occurred during working hours, on the employer's premises,
and that the treatment would have been given in the employee dispensary had it not been closed at the time of the appellant's injury, the case seems more appropriately suited for a "course of employment" analysis. In addition, in light of the expressed
preference of the Pennsylvania courts to construe "course of employment" liberally, the decision in Tatrai may have been an unnecessary break with the past trend of determining compensability
in Pennsylvania. Adoption of the dual capacity doctrine, at least in
this type of factual situation, may actually represent a narrowing
of the "course of employment" theory and, ultimately, of compensability under the Act. Thus, while the employee appears to have
gained a common law tort action under the dual capacity doctrine,
it may have been gained at the expense of the right to statutory
benefits in certain types of cases.
Additionally, because of the somewhat confusing status of the
two opinions in Tatrai, one might argue that the dual capacity
doctrine was perhaps not expressly adopted by the court.10 0 In
light of this uncertainty, it will be necessary to follow the courts'
interpretation of Tatrai before the status of the dual capacity doctrine in Pennsylvania can be clearly determined.
Gretchen Lengel Kelly

100.

See supra note 12.

